Stephen W. Sears. Gettysburg. Houghton, 2004.

Sears’ Gettysburg may be the definitive book on the Battle of Gettysburg. It covers nearly all the aspects about as carefully as possible. It discusses the military and political events leading up to the battle—including a reminder of what was going on in and around Vicksburg, Mississippi. It covers each of the various fronts in the battle and gives credit where credit is due.

Both Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis thought that a successful incursion into Northern states would get many Northern politicians talking of peace. Lee was convinced it could affect the outcome of the 1864 elections. Things have not changed much. We see how in 2021 different countries have reacted to the outcome of the recent American elections. As they say, follow the money.

Sears notes that in many cases such as Fredericksburg and even Chancellorsville, Lee more or less chose where to fight. His army had the better ground. Being outnumbered in most instances, he felt he had to be aggressive. That strategy had worked. Lee’s problem according to Sears was that he began to believe Confederate propaganda, that the Southern leaders were smarter and the Northern soldiers were cowards. See Proverbs 16:18.

Some of the Union military leaders understood the importance of good ground, especially after the disaster at Fredericksburg. When Buford and Reynolds saw that a significant portion of the Army of Northern Virginia was coming towards Gettysburg, they chose good ground. When General Meade finally arrived, he commended them for it and took a defensive position on the higher ground.

Another important factor Sears notes is that this time the Union had much better intelligence. Several cavalry units were trailing Lee’s army and the Bureau of Military Intelligence (B.M.I.) was doing its job. Lee, on the other hand, was depending on Stuart’s cavalry, and Stuart was raiding and causing some problems in Pennsylvania towns, but he was out of touch with Lee or any of his men. If it had not been for the freelance spy Henry Thomas Harrison, the Rebels would have known even less.

As it was, the first two days resulted in pretty much a stalemate. The Rebels made a few advances, but their main thrusts were stopped. In some cases it probably had to do with generals who were too cautious and missed some good chances. In other cases, it may have just been luck or the army ran out of daylight. On the Confederate side, A.P. Hill comes under criticism for being too cautious, although part of the problem may have been poor intelligence.

One Union general who comes in for great criticism is Sickles. It appears that either he misunderstood or openly did not follow the orders he was given. He also was a politician with little military experience and simply may have misjudged some things. He needlessly lost many men, and the Union was fortunate that the Rebels were kept at bay on other fronts.

General Longstreet comes out of the battle and this book looking pretty good. He disagreed with Lee’s plan. There is some evidence, especially considering Sickles’ poor leadership, that Longstreet’s plan may have worked better. But that is 20-20 hindsight. At any rate, once Longstreet got his orders, he obeyed them to the best of his and his men’s ability. When Pickett was asked why his charge failed (and he was under Longstreet), he replied “I think the Union army had something to do with it.” (78)

There were many little fronts surrounding the town of Gettysburg, and Sears covers them all. Thanks to the great Gettysburg film, based on the novel The Killer Angels, the opening salvos, the battle for Little Round Top, and Pickett’s Charge on the last day are the best known today, and Sears does not slight them.

There were other fights as well: Culp’s Hill, Cemetery Ridge, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, Rose’s Farm, Devil’s Den. All had an effect on the eventual outcome. Since Lee’s attacks on the flanks the second day did not budge the Union army much, Lee guessed that the center was weaker, that most of the soldiers in blue had been on the flanks. His solution was a massive attack on the center.

If there was a single factor on the third day, it was that the Union artillery was much stronger than Lee thought. Artillery barrages literally mowed down Southern attackers in the charge on the last day. As others have done, Sears notes that that charge should be known as the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble charge. The other two generals had more men in the charge, but postwar publicity in particular seemed to single out Gen. Pickett.

In spite of great losses in getting there, some Rebel soldiers made it to the Union lines and engaged in close combat. Still, they eventually had to retreat if they were not killed or captured. Close to 120,000 men were involved in the three-day battle. About 57,000 were casualties according to Sears.

As he put it, Gettysburg with the fall of Vicksburg the next day was probably not so much the beginning of the end of the war as the end of the beginning of the war. Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan would work in time. The seceding states would be surrounded. It became a war of attrition.

Sears uses hundreds of primary sources: letters, memoirs, periodical articles, government documents. We get a good sense of what was happening in many units and from many perspectives. Where I live and teach, there is a certain interest in the 14th Connecticut Infantry regiment because most of its men came from the area. While I certainly did not expect him to delineate specific exploits of specific soldiers in that unit, I was happy to note that he mentioned them a few times as they had a hot time at the Angle on the third day.

He mentions that the British envoy Col. Arthur Fremantle wrote a book on his observations of the Civil War. A piece from someone who was not on either side might be worth reading. Sears notes that military observers from Prussia and Austria also came to Gettysburg. (N.B. I did eventually follow up and read Fremantle’s memoir.)

The book ends with a brief description of the November dedication of the Military Cemetery at Gettysburg. He gives President Lincoln a lot of credit for succinctly, plainly, and effectively describing the Union cause. It was ultimately for freedom.

Sears writes very well. In spite of the detail, he narrates the events as though he were telling a story. The quotations and actions keep the tale moving.

Many people have criticized Meade and the Army of the Potomac for not following through and attacking the retreating Rebels. Some felt if Meade had made hot pursuit, he could have finished off Lee’s army then. Sears doubts it. Yes, the Union won the battle, but they were pretty beaten up, too. Lee also made a point of setting up his encampments on good ground during his retreat. Sears thinks Meade was wise in not following, that he likely would have fallen into a trap.

He notes that Meade remained the commander of the Army of the Potomac for the rest of the war. When Grant moved to the East, he was given charge over all the armies, not just those in Virginia and Maryland. Sears also speaks highly of Winfield Scott Hancock. His knowledge and resolve helped win the battle. His contribution to the ultimate Union success is important as well. Even engineering chief General Gouverneur Warren gets kudos for his vision. An army is more than just one man.

One side note. I am a fan on the film Gettysburg. This may sound like heresy, but I actually think the film is a little better than The Killer Angels, the novel that the film is based on. One thing that struck me was that nearly all the lines delivered by the officers in the film are direct quotations from what was written in primary sources. Yes, some of the characters, notably Sergeant Buster Kilrain, are fictional, but the movie gets the main thrust right.

N.B. The parenthetical reference is a Kindle location, not a page number.