Dwight D. Eisenhower. Crusade in Europe. Doubleday, 1950.

Crusade in Europe is a classic military memoir by the general who led the Allied forces against Germany and its allies in Europe in World War II. It covers North Africa and Italy but focuses on D-Day and the fall of Germany. Since many people know at least in broad terms what happened, this review will point out significant observations that Eisenhower made.

One point Eisenhower makes immediately is that historically alliances are unreliable. I just finished Shakespeare’s Henry IV Part 1 in two of my classes. That play illustrates this principle clearly. Eisenhower notes that Napoleon succeeded in most of his campaigns because he fought alliances, and the parties disagreed among themselves—just like the Percys in Henry IV. He stresses how important it was to have one overall commander. While he supported the idea, he tells us that he never expected to get the position. He had been promoted so quickly that he was a two-star general but still officially listed as a lieutenant colonel in regular army.

He could keep alliances going. He seemed to get along with everyone and sticks up with nearly every military and political person he had to work with, even General Montgomery, who had a reputation of being full of himself. Eisenhower admired and trusted Patton and stood up against the criticism he often received in the press. Among other things, he notes that Patton’s men were loyal to him. I mentioned in an earlier review that I had an uncle who was in the army in North Africa, Italy, and Northern Europe. The two generals he spoke most highly of were Patton and Eisenhower.

Eisenhower sometimes disagreed with Winston Churchill, but they would always come to an arrangement and carried mutual respect. At the very end he worked with General Zhukov who was leading the Red Army in Germany. He writes that while he was not especially sympathetic to Roosevelt’s domestic policies, that as a war leader of the country, F.D.R. “seemed to me to fulfill all that could possibly be expected of him.” (414)

It seems like the only person he had true difficulties with was Charles de Gaulle. Now, at the beginning of U.S. involvement it was unclear whose side De Gaulle was on. Later Eisenhower understood that once France had been the key power in Europe, and the rapid fall to the German Blitzkrieg was an embarrassment. One French general confided that “we…defeated ourselves.” Throughout, Eisenhower stresses the importance of keeping the alliance “on positive terms.”

He even explains why he called the World War a crusade:

…never before in a war between many nations the forces that stood for human good and man’s rights were this time confronted by a completely evil conspiracy with which no compromise could be tolerated. Because only by the utter destruction of the Axis was a decent world possible, the war became for me a crusade in the traditional sense of that often misused word. (157)

Eisenhower did have some challenges working with the press. Even though the press from the allied nations were all on the same side (something President Reagan contrasted with the press coverage of the Grenada rescue), reporters are looking for conflict, and much of the internal conflict they were reporting on had been fabricated. He also learned—as this reviewer had to learn when he was in the service—not all journalists respect classified or off the record information.

Sometimes there are quips that entertain, or as Eisenhower would say, contribute to morale. He does not quote the famous saying of the 101st Airborne when it was surrounded in Bastogne or General McAuliffe’s monosyllabic reply to the German call for surrender. He does tell the story that when the German garrison guarding the city of Aachen was limited to one building, the American VII Corps started using 155-millimeter rifles to knock the building’s walls down. The German commander surrendered and said, “When the Americans start using 155s as sniper weapons, it is time to give up” (312).

According to Eisenhower two key factors accounted for the Allied victory. World War II was the first war that used concentrated air power. Along with that was the increased industrial production from the Allies. By the beginning of 1943, Germany simply could not keep up. Early in the war, Germany had the advantage in both areas. No allied country was prepared. But by 1943 America in particular was assembling ships, landing craft, airplanes, tanks, jeeps, and weapons at an astounding rate. In one day of bombing in February 1945, the Allies put 9,000 planes in the air over Germany.

Eisenhower tells us that as the Allied forces were massing at the German border in the late fall of 1944, General Omar Bradley predicted that Germany’s only chance to successfully repel their attack would be if they made an advance at the Ardennes Forest. He then drew a likely German plan of attack on a map. “Within a maximum of five miles at any point,” Bradley correctly indicated the “bulge” of what became known as the Battle of the Bulge.

He also tells of how Patton’s troops almost by accident discovered the salt mine where the Nazis had hoarded many stolen valuables and art treasures including “a few millions of gold coins from the United States” (407).

A number of times on the Western Front, they were surprised when the Germans made a move that made little sense and ultimately hurt them. We noted in another review something similar on Hitler’s Eastern Front. They realized that Hitler was overriding his generals according to his own intuition. In that respect, he said, “…we owed a lot to Hitler” (394).

At one point near the end of the war, he described coming to the first concentration camp his troops liberated at Gotha. He said, “I have never at any other time experienced an equal sense of shock.” He made a point of exploring every part of the camp noting details in case people would say “the stories of Nazi brutality were just propaganda” (404).

Towards the end of the war in Europe, the Allies had to coordinate with the Red Army. Eisenhower’s contact had always been with Stalin. Eisenhower always refers to him as Generalissimo Stalin: He controlled everything. At the Russian and Western lines approached each other, Stalin let the local commander, General Zhukov, act as liaison.

Eisenhower shares some lessons he learned dealing with the Russians and Communists that could still be useful in Western nations that deal with Russia and China today. Eisenhower had a difficult time understanding how the Red Army promoted morale since the Russian command saw the troops as so much cannon fodder. He guessed the morale was simply based only “upon patriotism, possibly of fanaticism” (468).

Another Russian general was surprised that the Western Allies were concerned about the treatment of German prisoners. The Geneva Convention meant little to them. Also when the Western press wrote something unfavorable about the Soviets or Red Army, the Russian command expected the Allied authorities to censor or punish them in some way. When Eisenhower explained freedom of the press, the response was simply, “If you were Russia’s friend, you will do something about it.”This sounds like what the West is encountering with China today. Eisenhower concludes:

Communism inspires and enables its militant preachers to exploit injustices and inequity among men…The sequel is dictatorial rule…Were they completely confident in the rectitude and appeal of their own doctrine, there would be no necessity to follow an aggressive policy. (476-477)

Jesus might say, “You will recognize them by their fruits” (Matthew 7:16).

Eisenhower tells of meeting Truman after he became President in 1945. Prior to that, he had only met him “casually two or three times.” Since the war was over, Eisenhower expressed to him a desire to retire quietly. But when they were alone, “he suddenly turned to me and said:’General, there is nothing that I won’t try to help you get. That definitely and specifically includes the presidency in 1948” (446).

At the time, Eisenhower considered this an “astounding proposition.” Crusade in Europe first came out in 1948. However, we know what happened in 1952. The general may have been astounded, but he must have taken the President’s proposition seriously.